Abstract. We propose a framework for reasoning about program security building on language-theoretic and coalgebraic concepts. The behaviour of a system is viewed as a mapping from traces of high (unobservable) events to low (observable) events: the less the degree of dependency of low events on high traces, the more secure the system. We take the abstract view that low events are drawn from a generic semiring, where they can be combined using product and sum operations; throughout the paper, we provide instances of this framework, obtained by concrete instantiations of the underlying semiring. We specify systems via a simple process calculus, whose semantics is given as the unique homomorphism from the calculus into the set of behaviours, i.e. formal power series, seen as a final coalgebra. We provide a compositional semantics for the calculus in terms of rational operators on formal power series and show that the final and the compositional semantics coincide.
Introduction
Security analysis of programs has traditionally been centered on a notion of noninterference [15] . Research has mostly been into a functional interpretation whereby a program is acceptable if low-confidentiality variables or actions do not depend on high-confidentiality ones. This approach has been developed in both imperative [23] and process algebraic [14] settings. Non-interference is now generally recognised as enforcing too strict a policy. For this reason, more flexible variants of this concept are often considered. In declassification, a program may be declared as acceptable if information can flow from high to low but only in prescribed ways [11, 24] . In more recent years, attempts have been made to provide methods to quantify the amount of leaked information, mostly building on information-theoretic or probabilistic tools [12, 13, 8, 6] . Then a program may be declared as acceptable if the information it leaks does not exceed a prescribed threshold.
In this paper, we propose a framework for reasoning about information leakage that builds on language-theoretic and coalgebraic concepts. The framework offers a unifying view of diverse facets of language security, such as those mentioned above, puts them in a more abstract perspective and possibly paves the way to their unification. It also elucidates interesting connections between language-based security, coalgebras and language theory. measures, in case probabilistic behaviour is involved. In the example above, L(P) can be seen as a stochastic matrix whose rows and columns are indexed by high-and lowtraces, respectively, and its capacity can be computed by standard techniques. Indeed, an information theorist might recognize in this example an instance of the noisy Z-channel having {h, h } and {l, l l } as an input and an output alphabet, respectively.
In essence, it is crucial for the designer to be able to specify L(P), generate it and reason on it -e.g. prove that two system specifications generate the same behavioursin a compositional, syntax-driven fashion. We face these issues and draw on languagetheoretic concepts. We take the general view that observable events are elements of a semiring [17] , S, whose product and sum correspond to the and + operations mentioned above. A set of unobservable, high-events H is assumed. The security significant behaviour of the system, L(P), is then a mapping from H * to S, that is a formal power series () on H and S [17] . We provide a simple process calculus to specify systems, equipped with an operational semantics given in terms of Moore automata. Then, following [22] , we characterize the semantic mapping L(·) in terms of the unique homomorphism from this calculus into the set of formal power series seen as a final coalgebra. We next provide a compositional semantics of the calculus in terms of rational operators on 's, defined via behavioural differential equations ('s) [22] . We show that the final and the compositional semantics coincide. A consequence of this result is a Kleene theorem saying that, in our calculus, all and only the rational 's are definable. The benefits of the two semantics can be summed up as follows: the final semantics allows for reasoning -proving equivalences -on systems by co-induction, while the compositional semantics, and in particular the 's, can be used for step-wise, syntax-driven generation of the behaviours L(P), for any P. Throughout the paper, we provide instances of this framework obtained by concrete instantiations of the semiring S, and examples that illustrate these ideas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide background notions about semirings and formal power series and introduce a few concrete instances of them that are relevant to information leakage analysis. In Section 3 we give the syntax and operational semantics of the language. In Section 4 we describe the abstract semantics using finality and characterize the semantic mapping in terms of language equivalence. Following this, we provide a compositional semantics and show that the final and the compositional semantics coincide in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide two non-trivial examples illustrating the use of the compositional semantics and of the language as a modelling tool. To round off the paper, in Section 7 we briefly discuss an extension of the language with a simple form of parallel composition. Finally we offer some comparison with related work and directions for future research. All proofs have been confined to the Appendix.
The simplest possible semiring is B, obtained by taking S = {0, 1} and + and × to be the sum and product of booleans, that is or and and. Other examples of semirings are the natural numbers N and the nonnegative reals R + . Every ring, hence every field, is of course a semiring. As an example of a non-commutative semiring, consider a finite and non-empty alphabet A; then, L = (2 A * , ∪, ·, ∅, { }), with ∪ being language union, · being language concatenation and being the empty string, is the semiring of languages over A.
Fix a semiring S = (S , +, ×, 0, 1) and a finite, non-empty alphabet A. A formal power series () over A with coefficients in S is a function σ : A * → S. The set of all such functions will be denoted by F A,S , or simply by F when no ambiguity arises. Given σ, τ ∈ F, the sum σ + τ and convolution product σ × τ are the 's defined in the expected manner, that is, by setting for each w ∈ A *
where, on the right-hand side + ( ) and × respectively denote sum and product in S. Note that there is no harm in overloading the symbols + and × as we do here. Indeed, S can be seen as a subset of F by identifying each o ∈ S with the  σ such that σ( ) = o and σ(w) = 0 elsewhere. This identification is easily seen to preserve the meaning of +, ×, 0 and 1. It is readily checked that (F, +, ×, 0, 1) is in turn a (non-commutative) semiring.
Let us now fix a finite, non-empty alphabet L, ranged over by l, l , .... In the rest of the paper, elements of L will usually be interpreted as observable, low confidentiality actions, as opposed to unobservable, high confidentiality actions, to be introduced in the next section. For the time being, however, there is no need to fix a specific interpretation of L. We let λ, λ , ... range over L * . The semiring WL of weighted (low-)traces is defined as F L,R + . That is, weighted (low-)traces are functions o : L * → R + , with operations of sum and product defined as in (1) above. The reason for our interest in this semiring is that it includes all functions o :
, that is, all probability distributions on low traces, as well as all functions o such that λ∈L * o(λ) ≤ 1, that is, all probability sub-distributions. Note that neither of these two sets forms a semiring, which explains why it is mathematically convenient to work with the larger set WL. In what follows we shall sometimes take the freedom of writing down weighted (low-)traces as formal sums. For instance, M (that is, given I 1 , I 2 ⊆ M, I 1 I 2 = {m m |m ∈ I 1 , m ∈ I 2 }) and ∅ denotes the empty set, which is also the nowhere defined partial function. It is readily checked that M is a semiring.
A process calculus
Let us fix a finite, non-empty alphabet H, ranged over by h, h , . . .. It is convenient to think of H as a set of unobservable, high-confidentiality actions (as opposed to the set L introduced in the preceding section; the two sets are assumed to be disjoint). We let π, π , . . . range over H * . Let us fix a semiring S. The set of all processes is given by the following syntax
where o ∈ S, h ∈ H and f : S → S is a semiring morphism. As usual, +, ; and * denote nondeterministic choice, sequential composition and iteration, respectively; P f is a filtering operator that applies the filter f -a morphism on the semiring -to the observable events produced by P; the condition that f be a morphism appears to be quite natural, and yields a compositional way to compute filter applications. Given processes P 1 , . . . , P n , we let i=1...n P i denote P 1 + . . . + P n , where the summands are arranged in any arbitrary fixed order. By convention, we let this summation denote 0 ∈ S when n = 0. In what follows, we shall not commit to any specific semiring, even though our reference instance is meant to be WL. The set of all processes is denoted by P S , or simply by P when there is no need to be specific about S. A measure, ∆ : P S → S, is a map from processes to the semiring S. Let M be the set of all measures. For any P ∈ P, we let δ(P) denote the measure ∆ s.t. ∆(Q) = 1 if Q = P, ∆(Q) = 0 otherwise; note that here 0, 1 ∈ S. It is useful to define operations of internal sum and scalar product for measures. For each P:
where on the right hand side of the definitions the operations are those of the semiring S. Such an overload of the symbols + ( ) and × is harmless, as any ambiguity is easily resolved by the context. With these operations, every measure can be written as ∆ = P∈P ∆(P) × δ(P). A few syntactic operations on measures will be useful. Syntactic right-multiplication by a process: if ∆ = P∈P ∆(P) × δ(P), then ∆; Q P∈P ∆(P) × δ(P; Q). Syntactic left-multiplication, Q; ∆, is defined similarly. Finally, syntactic filtering: with the same ∆ as above, ∆ f P∈P f (∆(P)) × δ(P f ). When describing the semantics, the following two notable measures will turn out to be useful. For every P ∈ P:
The operational semantics of P is given by a pair of functions (w, −→). Here, for each P, w(P) ∈ S is the final weight of P, corresponding to the observation that can be made upon P in the current state. A non-zero weight may be understood as indicating the possibility of immediate termination. Specifically, w ∈ M is a measure defined by induction on P as follows 1 :
The function −→ : (P × H) → M, describes the effect of executing a high action and making a transition to a measure. As customary, (P, h, ∆) ∈ −→ will be written as P h −→ ∆. The judgments defining P h −→ ∆ are reported below, where we assume h h.
The rules should be self explanatory. In particular, the rule for sequential composition states that the h-derivative of P; Q results from summing up h-derivatives originating from P, with Q as a sequel, and from Q; the latter contributes to the sum only if P may terminate immediately. The rule for filtering P with f applies the filter f to every element of the derivative of P. The rule for P * is obvious if one thinks that Kleene's law, namely P * = 1 + P; P * , should remain valid in our setting. The operational semantics (w, −→) can be turned into a more traditional representation in terms of state-transition machines. Recall that a weighted automaton [17, 22] is like a nondeterministic automaton, but both its arcs and its states are also labelled with weights taken from a semiring.
Here, we define a weighted automaton where states are P, the state labeling function is w(·) and the transition relation −→ ⊆ P × H × S × P is defined thus: (P, h, o, P ) ∈ −→, written P h,o −→ P , whenever P h −→ ∆ and ∆(P ) = o 0. As an example, the weighted automaton for the process Q = (o 2 ; h + o 3 ; h ) * is given here on the right, where the leftmost state corresponds to process Q and the rightmost one to 1; Q. In the next section, we shall introduce an abstract semantics that equates automata with the same weighted language. It will turn out that the classical law Q = 1; Q holds also in our setting; a possible application of such a law could be simplification of the previous automaton to one with just one state (the rightmost one).
To conclude, let us fix S = WL and give a specification in our language of the Zchannel mentioned in the Introduction. The input alphabet is h, h ∈ H and the output 1 Note that the semantics of Q * is usually taken as undefined when w(Q) 0: the reason is evident if one tries to expand Q * according to Kleene's law, namely Q * = 1 + Q; Q * . Here, for simplicity, in case w(Q) 0 we stipulate w(Q * ) = 0, so as to avoid dealing with a partial semantic function.
As we shall see, this turns out to be equivalent to h; l + h ; (pl l + (1 − p)l).
Abstract semantics
We first describe the abstract semantics of P by finality and then characterize the semantic mapping in terms of (weighted) language equivalence. We endow P with a Moore automaton structure 2 and then define its semantics coalgebraically, following [22, 7] . Recall that a Moore automaton with inputs in a finite non-empty alphabet A and outputs in K is a triple (Q, δ, γ) where Q is a (not necessarily finite) set of states, δ : Q × A → Q is a transition function and γ : Q → K is an output function. Let us keep A and K fixed. Central to this treatment is the notion of bisimulation.
for every a ∈ A. We write q ∼ q if there exists a bisimulation relating q and q .
The relation ∼ over Q is easily seen to be an equivalence relation and a bisimulation in turn. A homomorphism between two Moore automata M and M is a function φ mapping the states of M to the states of M such that, with an obvious symbology, for each q ∈ Q, γ(q) = γ (φ(q)) and, for each a ∈ A, φ(δ(q, a)) = δ (φ(q), a). The class of all Moore automata has a final object F that can be characterized in terms of 's. Specifically, we let F be the Moore automaton (Q, δ, γ) defined thus:
Theorem 1 (Finality and Coinduction principle [22] ). F is final in the class of Moore automata with inputs in A and outputs in K. That is, for every such automaton M there exists a unique homomorphism φ : M → F . Moreover, for every q and q states of M, it holds that q ∼ q if and only if φ(s) = φ(s ).
We proceed now to endow P with a Moore automaton structure, with inputs in H and outputs in the semiring S. Then, the above results will give us: (1) a notion of bisimulation, and (2) a canonical way of interpreting processes as 's, which is fully abstract w.r.t. bisimilarity. The construction goes as follows. We extend the weight function and transition relation to M by linearity. That is, if we let ∆ P,h be the unique measure such that P h −→ ∆ P,h (for each P, h and ∆), then we have:
Now, we let A (M, δ, w), where δ(∆, h) = ∆ h : this is a Moore automaton with inputs in H and outputs in S. Observe that P is naturally embedded in M, once one identifies P with the measure δ(P). We now let P ∼ Q stand for δ(P) ∼ δ(Q). It is crucial for the compositionality of the semantics that bisimilarity over P be a congruence.
Theorem 2. For every P, Q, R ∈ P such that P ∼ Q and for every semiring morphism f : S → S, it holds that:
Let us denote by L the unique homomorphism from A to F given by Theorem 1; it is a function of type M −→ F, mapping every measure to a . We want now to give a more explicit characterization of this homomorphism in terms of the operational semantics (w, −→) of P. To this purpose, we extend the notion of h-derivative of a state ∆, previously written ∆ h , to sequences of high actions π ∈ H * in the expected way:
To conclude, we can define the language generated by a process P, written L(P), as expected: L(P) L(δ(P)).
Let us now illustrate the semantics just introduced by a small, concrete example. Let us consider the Z-channel again, Z = h; l + h ; pl l + h ; (1 − p)l. The Moore automaton generated by δ(Z) (or, more formally, the portion of the infinite automaton A that is reachable from δ(Z)) according to the operational rules is given by
A compositional construction
We want to provide now another, more informative way of describing the semantic mapping L discussed in Section 4. In particular, we want to introduce the analog of the process operators over F and then prove that L is compositional w.r.t. these process operators (see Corollary 1 below). We follow the approach in [22, 7] and define operators on 's via behavioural differential equations ('s). Generally speaking, a  is a coinductive specification of a , providing its initial value -σ( ) -and the form of its derivatives σ h , for every h ∈ H. Of course, one has in general to prove that the given Initial condition equations have a unique solution. The advantage of this kind of definitions, over explicit but possibly more involved ones, is that they allow for coinductive, step-by-step reasoning on the 's they define. The 's defining the operators associated to the constructs of the language are given in Table 1 . There, for every π ∈ H * , we let
Indeed, some of these 's give rise to operators well-known in the literature on rational series: σ + σ and σ; σ are, respectively, just the sum and convolution product defined by (1) -so another notation for σ; σ is just σ×σ , while σ * is standard iteration (see e.g. [22] ). The main result of this section is Corollary 1 below.
Theorem 3. In F, there exist unique constants 'o' and 'h' and operators '+', ' ;', ' f ' and '
* ' that satisfy the 's in Table 1 .
Corollary 1 (compositionality). In F, the unique constants 'o' and 'h' and operators '+', ' ;', ' f ' and ' * ' defined by the 's in Table 1 also satisfy the following equalities:
An obvious consequence of the above result is a Kleene theorem for our language. Recall that a  σ ∈ F is rational [17] if it can be inductively built starting from the ' o and h (o ∈ S, h ∈ H) and using the sum, concatenation (sequential composition) and iteration operators defined above. The result entails that one can always eliminate (·) f , essentially by replacing each o occurring in the scope of (·) f by f (o).
Proposition 2 (a Kleene theorem). Let σ be a . Then σ is rational if and only if σ = L(P) for some process P ∈ P.
Examples

Modeling a "Single Bid" Auction
We model a scenario where each of a certain number of users (three, for simplicity) bids for an item at auction. Each user submits a single (secret) bid to a trusted central server that, in turn, decides the winner by choosing the user whose bid has the highest value. Let U 1 , U 2 , U 3 be the users; every user knows his bid and the outcome of the auction produced by the server; the problem is measuring the information that every user has about the other users' bids.
We choose a user, U 1 , model his view of the auction and try to understand what inferences he can perform about other users' bids -that is, U 1 represents here the (passive) attacker. U 1 's bid (a natural number between 1 and m) is an observable event modeled by actions l 1 , . . . , l m ; also the outcome of the auction (i.e., the index of the user that wins the auction) is an observable event modeled by actions l 1 , l 2 , l 3 . On the contrary, the bids of U 2 (taken from {1, . . . , n} and modeled by high actions h 1 , . . . , h n ) and of U 3 (taken from {1, . . . , q} and modeled by high actions h 1 , . . . , h q ) are unobservable events, from U 1 's point of view. Let us fix the semiring as S = WL.
A simple way to model the auction is by the following process:
where Pr(l i ) denotes the probability of the event l i and the element o i, j,k ∈ WL determines who is the winner of the auction. The actual definition of o i, j,k depends on how we decide to resolve conflicts arising from different users submitting the same bid. A simple but crude way is to resolve the conflict deterministically, e.g. by choosing the user with lowest index:
A fairer way of choosing the winner is by letting
where T i, j,k is the set of user indexes (i.e., T i, j,k ⊆ {1, 2, 3}) containing the indexes of the users who made the greatest bids among i, j, k. For example, if i = j = k, then T i, j,k = {1, 2, 3}; if i = j > k, then T i, j,k = {1, 2}; if i > j and i > k, then T i, j,k = {1}; and so on. We let P and Q be the process (3) that uses (4) and (5), respectively, as a definition of o i, j,k .
Let us now describe the matrix L(P). By the 's (or the operational semantics), the only entries with non-zero values are L(P)(h j h k )(l i l t ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k ∈ {1, . . . , q} and t such that o i, j,k = [l t → 1]; moreover, we have that L(P)(h j h k )(l i l t ) = Pr(l i ). Suppose now that an a priori probability distribution on high traces, Pr(π), reflecting the bidding behaviour of the users, is publicly known. U 1 can then perform some Bayesan inference about the bids of the other users: these inferences are of the form Pr(h j h k | l i l t ); by noting that L(P)(h j h k )(l i l t ) corresponds to Pr(l i l t | h j h k ) and by elementary probability theory
To make a concrete case, let us assume that each user has only two possible bidding values; thus, m = n = q = 2. In this case, L(P) is
Thus, Pr(h 1 h 1 | l 1 l 1 ) = 1, since Pr(l 1 | l 1 ) = Pr(h 1 h 1 ): indeed, by (4), the only possibility for U 1 to be the winner if he has bid 1 is to have all the bids at 1. The case for Pr(h 1 h 2 | l 1 l 3 ) is similar. Let us consider now Pr(h 2 h k | l 1 l 2 ), for any k ∈ {1, 2}; in this case, Pr(l 2 | l 1 ) = Pr(h 2 ) because, if U 1 has bid 1 and the winner is U 2 , it must be that U 2 's bid is 2, no matter of U 3 's bid. Thus, Pr(h 2 h k | l 1 l 2 ) = Pr(h k ), once we assume that the users bids are pairwise independent. Finally, let us consider Pr(h j h k | l 2 l 1 ), for any j and k. In this case, U 1 will always win; thus, Pr(l 1 | l 2 ) = Pr(l 2 ) and, hence,
Pr(l 2 ) . To sum up:
(a) he can determine with certainty the other bids if the winner is himself or U 3 : in the first case, the bids are 1 for everybody; in the second case, U 2 has bid 1 and U 3 has bid 2. (b) if the winner is U 2 , his only uncertainty is on U 3 's bid, since he knows that U 2 has bid 2.
2. if U 1 bids 2, he surely wins, but he cannot determine with certainty any other bid.
Let us now see how the matrix changes by passing from P to Q, and thus compare the two implementations of the auction system from the security point of view. The matrix for Q is: As expected, this system has more possible high-traces associated to the same low traces, that now are taken from a larger set. Therefore, in this second implementation of the auction system, U 1 can infer less information about the others' bids; in other words, Q is more secure than P. This statement can be made precise by saying that the capacity (see e.g. [8] ) of L(Q) is less than the capacity of L(P). We omit the detailed computation for lack of space. It is worth remarking that all the matrices shown can be calculated in a coinductive way via the 's presented in the previous section. Moreover, as discussed in [22] , such calculations are mechanizable.
Imperative computations
This section provides a different way of writing examples; indeed, instead of adopting a process algebraic flavour (like, e.g., in section 6.1), we adopt here a more imperative flavour, by exploiting the semiring of stores, M, described in Section 2. We let µ, µ , ... range over sets of stores, i.e. partial functions from a set of variables V to a data domain D that are both non-empty. Notationally, we write the singleton store
The filter operator (·) f can be used to express variable updates and conditionals mostly like in an imperative setting. Indeed, variable updates can be modelled by using elements of the semiring as process actions, like in e.g. [x = 1]; P. However, this feature only allows us to assign constants to variables. If we want to copy one variable into another, like in e.g. x := y, this trick does not work, and we have to use filters. For example, if x, y ∈ V, then the imperative program fragment P; x := 0; y := x + 1; Q corresponds to the following term in the calculus
We just have to prove that such a function is a semiring (endo)morphism. All properties are trivial, except for preservation of product. We have to show that f y:=x+1 (µ µ ) = 
The converse inclusion can be proved in a similar way. Similarly, the program fragment P; if (x y) then y := y + 1 else z := 1 corresponds to the term
Here the function f (x y) filters out the stores not satisfying the condition x y, that is f (x y) (µ) {m ∈ µ | m(x), m(y) are both defined and m(x) m(y)} ∪ {m ∈ µ : m(x) or m(y) is not defined} .
The other filtering functions are defined as expected. We can use the above ingredients to model the non-interference scenario commonly employed when reasoning on imperative programs. Specifically, let us assume that the set of variables V is partitioned into low and high ones, viz. V L and V H . We shall need a filter (·) f L that hides from the attacker the high-part of stores and is defined to be f L (µ) {m |V L : m ∈ µ} . In a term like P f L , assignments to high variables, [h = v], are not directly observable. Rather, in our modelling, it will be convenient to mark the occurrence of each such assignment with a distinct high event: the semantics L(P f L ) then takes care of establishing the correct correspondence between sequences of such events and observed stores. As an example, the program fragment h := 0; l := h, where h ∈ V H and l ∈ V L , is modelled as
In this setting, it is quite natural to model, for instance, a  checking scenario. A user chooses a 4-digit  and then stores it into a high variable h. The attacker chooses a guess for this  and stores it into a low variable l. This behaviour is modelled by
The -checker then checks h against l and stores the result of the comparison into the low variable r. The whole system is now modelled by:
where the filtering functions f h=l and f h l are defined as expected. We could now generate the function L(Check) via the 's and check that it violates non-interference: indeed, L(Check) maps the trace h i to the set of stores
: j i}; therefore, for i j, we have µ i µ j . We could make the behaviour of the  checker more refined, by e.g. combining the two semirings considered in Section 2 and associate probabilities with the choice of the secret and the attacker's guess.
Parallelism
The interpretation of parallelism and synchronization is notoriously problematic when probability is involved. On the other hand, if we content ourselves with just weightsindeed in our calculus we never require weights to add up to 1 -parallelism becomes much easier, as studied e.g. by Hillston [16] and other authors doing stochastic process algebra. In fact, is technically easy to extend the language presented in Section 3 with operators that introduce some form of parallelism. The corresponding operational rules mimics those found in process calculi, e.g.  [7] . As a further simplification, in the following we shall confine ourselves to a pure interleaving operator, ||. We set w(P||Q) = w(P) × w(Q) and introduce the new operational rule
where, as expected, (∆||Q) is the measure that assigns the weight ∆(R) to any term of the form R||Q, and yields 0 elsewhere ((P||∆ ) is defined symmetrically). In the final semantics, this corresponds to the shuffle operator on  defined by the following :
As an example, assume H = {h, h } and L = {l, l } and consider P (h; o + h ; o ) * , for distinct h, h and o, o . This process behaves as a noiseless channel that reveals to the attacker the sequence of actions π ∈ H * is performed by the secret scheduler. Assume now that two other processes work in parallel with P producing distinct observable effects associated with h and h , thus
The system S is a quasi-perfect scrambler, that only reveals the total length of the sequence π performed by the three processes. Indeed, assume for instance that o = [l → . Then, in the row π (∈ H * ) of the matrix L(S ), the probability is uniformly distributed on the low-traces of length k, {l, l } k , where k = |π|.
Concluding Remarks
In the last eight years there has been steady activity in developing concepts, definitions and analyses in the area of measuring information flows for different languages. Ultimately, these aim at being a means of enforcing quantity based security policies. A highly desirable outcome of this effort would be the automatic checking of enforcement via either model checking or program analysis. So far, the efforts have lead to some notable progress for simple imperative languages [13, 21, 20, 4, 10] . By contrast, progress for process algebras has been notably slower. One problem has been establishing appropriate concepts. Lowe's work [18] provided a starting point, developed in quite diverse directions by many authors [6, 8, 9, 19, 3, 1] . Compared with these works, the present paper makes a conceptual, rather than technical, step, by introducing a general, flexible scheme for specifying and analysing regular behaviours of different kinds, of which quantitative ones are just one flavour. Our study has connections to the work of Rutten and his collaborators on coalgebras. As mentioned throughout the paper, the coalgebraic treatment of streams and 's was introduced, in a syntax-free framework, in [22] . In a recent paper [5] , they present a systematic way to generate languages of (generalised) regular expressions, and a sound and complete axiomatization thereof, for a wide variety of quantitative systems. There are two major differences between our work and theirs. First, they work with branchingrather than linear-time semantics: their final coalgebras are not 's, but more complicated objects with no natural interpretation in terms of traces, languages and security analysis. Second, they focus on axiomatizations rather than on compositional semantics in terms of rational operators and 's, as we do here.
Future developments of the present framework are exploring instantiations and interpretations of the semiring, as well as expanding the process language. Clearly the addition of a parallel operator with synchronization would be a significant enhancement, although it would lead us outside the realm of regular behaviours. So far this extension has presented non-trivial difficulties.
APPENDIX: Proofs
First, it is worth remarking the following properties of some operators defined. Recall that a semimodule [17] is an algebraic structure satisfying the same axioms as a vector space, with the difference that scalars range in a semiring rather than in a field.
Proposition 3.
1. M is a semimodule with the internal sum and scalar product defined in (2)
Proof. The first three items directly come from the definitions.
4.
(
where the first equality directly comes from (2), the second equality is ensured by the fact that f is a semiring morphism and the third one by associativity and distributivity of the semiring.
where the first equality directly comes from (2), the second equality is ensured by the fact that f is a semiring morphism and the third one by distributivity and associativity of the semiring. 
Let us now move to proving that ∼ is a congruence. We first need two auxiliary results.
Theorem 4. For every ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ∈ M such that ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 , it holds that:
3. ∆ 1 ; P ∼ ∆ 2 ; Q, for every P, Q ∈ P such that P ∼ Q; 4. ∆ 1 f ∼ ∆ 2 f , for every semiring morphism f .
Proof.
We prove that
-The output is the same:
where the first equality holds because of distributivity in the semiring and the second equality holds because w(∆ 1 ) = w(∆ 2 ), being ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 .
-The derivatives are still bisimilar:
where the first equality holds because of Proposition 2(1). Similarly, (
where the two equalities are due to Proposition 2 (3, 2) .
3. We prove that
is a bisimulation; this trivially implies the result by taking
Similarly, w((∆ ; Q) + ∆ 2 ) = w(Q) × w(∆ ) + w(∆ 2 ). Now, w(P) = w(Q), because P ∼ Q, w(∆ ) = w(∆ ), because ∆ ∼ ∆ , and w(∆ 1 ) = w(∆ 2 ), because ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 ; this suffices to conclude that w((∆ ; P) + ∆ 1 ) = w((∆ ; Q) + ∆ 2 ).
where the first equality holds because of Proposition 2(1), the second one derives from the operational semantics of sequential composition, the third one by Proposition 2(2), the fourth one by Proposition 2(4,3), the fifth one by Proposition 3(2) and the last one by Proposition 2(1). Similarly with Q in place of P, ∆ in place of ∆ and ∆ 2 in place of ∆ 1 . By hypothesis, (∆ 1 ) h ∼ (∆ 2 ) h ; moreover, the fact that ∆ P,h ∼ ∆ Q,h (that holds because P ∼ Q), w(∆ ) = w(∆ ) and Theorem 4(2) allow us to conclude that w(∆ ) × ∆ P,h ∼ w(∆ ) × ∆ Q,h . Thus, by Theorem 4(1), (w(∆ ) × ∆ P,h ) + (∆ 1 ) h ∼ (w(∆ ) × ∆ Q,h ) + (∆ 2 ) h . Thanks to Proposition 3(1), this suffices to conclude that (((∆ ; P) + ∆ 1 ) h , ((∆ ; Q) + ∆ 2 ) h ) ∈ R, as required. 4 . We prove that R {(∆ 1 f , ∆ 2 f ) : ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 } is a bisimulation.
f (w(∆ 1 )) = f (w(∆ 2 )) = w(∆ 2 f ) where the fourth step has been obtained by using preservation of product and sum ensured by the fact that f is a morphism.
where the first equality comes from the definition of the operational semantics and the last two ones are due to Proposition 3 (4, 5) . Similarly, (∆ 2 f ) h = (∆ 2 ) h f . Since (∆ 1 ) h ∼ (∆ 2 ) h , we conclude that ((∆ 1 ) h f , (∆ 2 ) h f ) ∈ R.
Lemma 1. δ(P) + δ(Q) ∼ δ(P + Q).
w(δ(P) + δ(Q)) R∈P (δ(P) + δ(Q))(R) × w(R) R∈P (δ(P)(R) + δ(Q)(R)) × w(R) = R∈P δ(P)(R) × w(R) pl R∈P δ(Q)(R) × w(R) = δ(P)(P) × w(P) + δ(Q)(Q) × w(Q) = w(P) + w(Q) w(P + Q) = w(δ(P + Q)) -The derivative is the same: (δ(P) + δ(Q)) h R∈P (δ(P) + δ(Q))(R) × ∆ R,h R∈P (δ(P)(R) + δ(Q)(R)) × ∆ R,h ( R∈P δ(P)(R) × ∆ R,h ) + ( R∈P δ(Q)(R) × ∆ R,h ) = ∆ P,h + ∆ Q,h = ∆ P+Q,h = R∈P (δ(P + Q))(R) × ∆ R,h (δ(P + Q)) h
Indeed, by definition of the operational semantics, P h −→ ∆ P,h and Q h −→ ∆ Q,h imply that P + Q h −→ ∆ P,h + ∆ Q,h ∆ P+Q,h .
Proof of Theorem 2:
The first fact is a trivial consequence of Theorem 4(1) and Lemma 1. The second fact is a trivial consequence of Theorem 4(3) and of the fact that, by definition, δ(P; R) = δ(P); R. The third fact is a trivial consequence of Theorem 4(4) and of the fact that, by definition, δ(P f ) = (δ(P)) f . Let us prove the fourth fact. We prove that R {(∆ 1 ; P * , ∆ 2 ; Q * ) : P ∼ Q and ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 } is a bisimulation; this trivially implies the result by taking ∆ 1 = ∆ 2 = 1 M and by noting that 1 M ; P δ(1; P) ∼ δ(P), for every P.
w(∆ 1 ; P * ) R∈P (∆ 1 ; P * )(R) × w(R) = R ∈P ∆ 1 (R ) × w(R ) × w(P * ) = w(P * ) × w(∆ 1 ) = w(Q * ) × w(∆ 2 ) = w(∆ 2 ; Q * )
Indeed, w(∆ 1 ) = w(∆ 2 ), since ∆ 1 ∼ ∆ 2 . Moreover, w(P * ) is 1, if w(P) = 0, and is 0, otherwise; thus, w(P * ) = w(Q * ) by the fact that w(P) = w(Q), that holds since P ∼ Q.
(∆ 1 ; P * ) h R∈P (∆ 1 ; P * )(R) × ∆ R,h = R ∈P ∆ 1 (R ) × ∆ R ;P * ,h = R ∈P ∆ 1 (R ) × (∆ R ,h ; P * + w(R ) × ∆ P * ,h ) = R ∈P ∆ 1 (R ) × ∆ R ,h ; P * + R ∈P ∆ 1 (R ) × (w(R ) × (∆ P,h ; P * )) = (∆ 1 ) h ; P * + (w(∆ 1 ) × ∆ P,h ); P * = ((∆ 1 ) h + w(∆ 1 ) × ∆ P,h ); P * .
Similarly for Q in place of P and ∆ 2 in place of ∆ 1 . Now, since w(∆ 1 ) = w(∆ 2 ) and ∆ P,h ∼ ∆ Q,h , by Theorem 4(2) w(∆ 1 ) × ∆ P,h ∼ w(∆ 2 ) × ∆ Q,h ; by (∆ 1 ) h ∼ (∆ 2 ) h and Theorem 4(1), ((∆ 1 ) h + w(∆ 1 ) × ∆ P,h ) ∼ ((∆ 2 ) h + w(∆ 2 ) × ∆ Q,h ). This suffices to conclude that ((∆ 1 ; P * ) h , (∆ 2 ; Q * ) h ) ∈ R, as desired.
To prove Corollary 1, we characterize the solutions of the 's in an operational manner, as follows. For each σ ∈ F, fix a distinct symbol σ. We consider a syntax of extended process EP, which includes P, built out of the following grammar which features an extra clause for constants:
The weight function and operational semantics of Section 3 are extended by the rules w(σ) = σ( ) and σ h −→ δ(σ h ) .
The definitions and results described for P -including the Moore automaton definition -carry over to EP. We shall continue to call L(·) the final morphism mapping EP to F. For its proof we need the following auxiliary results.
